Ethnic Minorities in China: Celebrated Diversity or Second-Class Citizens? Skip to main content
February 2025

Ethnic Minorities in China: Celebrated Diversity or Second-Class Citizens?

In the shadow of the Great Wall, a young Uyghur boy recites Mandarin phrases in a classroom where his native tongue is unwelcome. This is the face of China's ethnic policy—a delicate balance between celebrated diversity and forced assimilation.

China often seeks to project itself as a model of diversity, with 56 officially recognized ethnic groups and over 300 languages celebrated as part of its national identity [1]. However, this narrative masks a demographic reality where the Han ethnicity comprises approximately 92% of the population, leaving the remaining 55 ethnic groups to share just 8%.

This dominance significantly shapes the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) targeted minority policies, which range from autonomous regions and preferential treatment, to migration and assimilation. While some measures have reduced tensions, others have fueled violent discontent.

China’s human rights record, particularly in its treatment of Xinjiang Uyghurs, has drawn widespread international criticism and is probably the only news regarding ethnic minorities that many readers may have heard of. Allegations of cultural suppression, forced assimilation, and heavy-handed governance have raised questions about whether PRC policies promote unity or perpetuate second-class citizenship for its minority populations.

In the early days of the PRC, five autonomous regions were created to accommodate minority populations [2]. Minority groups were even granted the right to self-determination and succession, though that has since been rescinded [3].

China’s autonomous regions promise self-governance but are only autonomous in name. The real power in these regions is in the hands of the Party Secretaries, who are almost exclusively Han. Thus, the Han-majority Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls power in these regions.

Minority officials frequently face conflicting loyalties, and they are forced to choose between ethnic and national identity, which further undermines genuine autonomy. These characteristics make pledges of self-governance nothing more than empty promises.

One of China’s prominent leaders in the 1980s, Hu Yaobang, felt that minorities were being oppressed in China, in part due to the majority of autonomous region leadership being Han Chinese [4]. Hu introduced preferential policies to address the vast income gap between rural minority citizens and the urban Han majority.

Similar to policies introduced in the Native American Reservations of the US, financial investment in minority areas in China has proved ineffective. Decades after Hu’s leadership, minorities still struggle with income disparities, earning just 50% to 70% of Han incomes on average [5]. The communist government provided these numbers, likely meaning the income gap is far larger than these numbers suggest.

Under Hu, minorities were also exempt from the one-child policy. This is perhaps the best thing the CCP has ever done for the minority populations. The Han majority population suffered greatly under the one-child policy; forced abortions and sterilizations were common practices.

Han migration into minority regions is an unspoken cornerstone of the PRC’s strategy with damaging effects. Evidence of this mass migration is prominent in Xinjiang, where the Han population has grown from 7% in 1945 to over 36% [6]. Similar trends have occurred in Inner Mongolia and Guangxi, where Han migrants now form majorities.

Forced relocations further disrupt minority communities. Tibetan herders and Inner Mongolians have been resettled in urban areas under the guise of environmental preservation or economic development. Those relocated face extreme difficulties such as adapting to foreign language and cultural practices [7].

While internal migration may seem like a natural and harmless occurrence, it has had devastating consequences, increasing tensions and ethnic violence between the Han majority and their minority counterparts. In 2008, Tibetans rioted and lashed out against Han residents; subsequently, 140 civilians died. [8] This has also occurred in the Xinjiang region.

Violent reactions from minorities who feel they are losing their cultural and ethnic identities have been used as excuses for forced assimilation in government policies. The PRC’s assimilation policies have drawn the most attention, especially regarding Xinjiang where over 1 million Uyghur Muslims have been forcefully imprisoned in camps. While critics label these re-education camps as tools of cultural genocide, Chinese officials insist they are vocational centers designed to lift Uyghurs out of poverty and promote societal stability. [9]

Though Xi tries to claim otherwise, economic progress does not equate to human rights. Although China’s constitution guarantees the use of native language and religious freedom, restrictions on religious practices and prioritization of Mandarin over minority languages further push diversity into obscurity. [10]

China’s ethnic policies reflect a complex history of alliances and challenges. While early promises of autonomy and preferential policies fostered goodwill, contemporary strategies like migration and assimilation often intensify tensions.

To offer genuine assistance to minority groups, the PRC should increase access to minority language-based education, allow for the high-school completion test (gaokao) to be taken in minority languages, and provide actual vocational training for minority groups. However, this is unlikely to occur given the state of the current regime.

Under Xi Jinping, the PRC leans toward a nationalist agenda, prioritizing conformity over diversity. As Beijing’s grip tightens, will China’s minorities preserve their cultural identities, or will their histories fade into the background of a unified yet homogenized nation?

Hidden image